As the economies of
China and India take off, global concerns about their impact on energy
consumption and climate change have increased. Both countries have complex energy
regulatory and policy machinery that traditionally employs a five-year national
economic planning cycle. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the
emerging policy concerns in the context of energy related CO2 emissions in the
countries.
India’s energy
policymaking is highly fragmented and decentralized, with a strong tradition of
federalism. In India, the federal government has control over mineral and oil
resources, nuclear energy and some taxes. States, by contrast, have
jurisdiction over water and land rights, natural gas infrastructure, and
taxation of mineral rights and the consumption and sale of electricity. In
other areas, they share power, such as over electricity, forestry, and economic
planning. There is no institutional body that has overarching authority over a
national energy policy. Several ministries share power over various aspects of
energy policy and energy infrastructure, which can result in fragmented
decision-making. In addition, the country’s policy direction may shift as electoral
mandates change. Energy policy making in
China is much more centralized and top-down. The State Council, in accordance
with the vision of the Chinese Communist Party, sets the overall policy
direction of the country. The State Council’s various organs, primarily the
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), formulate and implement most
of the important energy policies. These policies are conveyed across the vast
country through provincial level NDRCs to ensure that the will of the central
government does not get misconstrued. There is no federalism in China, as in
theory the provinces are subordinate to the central government, although
the reality of implementation is often messier.
While China’s 13th five year
plan (FYP), was released in March 2016 and covers the period up to 2020. The
headline targets are to reduce energy intensity by 15 percent and carbon
intensity by 18 percent compared to 2015 levels. In addition, energy
consumption will be capped at 5 billion tons of coal equivalent, and the share
of primary energy consumption from non-renewable sources will increase to 15
percent.
Internationally, the Indian Government
has voluntarily agreed to reduce the emissions intensity of its gross domestic
product (GDP) by 20–25 percent from 2005 levels by 2020. Indian and
international studies suggest that India is likely to meet—or even exceed—this
pledge based on its existing policy package and macroeconomic trends.
Nevertheless, significant uncertainty surrounds the effective implementation of
these policies and changes in the GDP composition. Domestically, the Indian
Government launched the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which
includes eight missions to tackle climate change on a sector-by-sector basis.2
Although India has not apportioned the 20–25 percent energy intensity reduction
target to specific missions, at least two of these missions (the Jawaharlal
Nehru National Solar Mission and the National Mission for Enhanced Energy
Efficiency) are expected to contribute to meeting this goal. This is an advance
over the approach taken in the 11th 5-year plan, in which concern about climate
change was expressed in the form of a limited reference to the objective of
improving energy efficiency by 20 percent by 2016–17.
Both
countries’ economies are growing at an unprecedented pace. Due to high economic
growth based on rapid industrialisation, the energy consumption of both
countries is rising fast. Against this background, the quest for
energy security has transformed both countries’ policies domestically and
internationally. Thus showing a possibility for attaining a world with an economy driven by `green growth' .
Nupur Dass
20153044
This is a summary from two different sources. Where are your words?
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